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Abstract

The role of foreign aid in the form of food in furtherin g economic
developme nt of poor countries and in alleviatin g adverse impacts on the
poor of structura l and sectoral adjustmen t programme s in these countries
is discussed .

A simple analytica l framework for evaluatin g the incentive

and welfare impacts of food aid is suggested .

Because of policy

intervent ions, domestic and internati onal markets for food have been
historica lly subject to severe distortio ns leading to ever growing food
stocks in some, mainly rich, countries while in others, largely poor,
many cannot afford to consume enough food.

The possible impact of

distortio n-free global food markets is sketched.

The use of surplus food

for payment of wages-in- kind to workers employed in rural works programme s
thereby creating productiv e assets while alleviatin g poverty has often
been proposed.

With an applied general equililbri um model of the Indian

economy, it is shown that a well-desi gned and efficient ly implement ed
food-for-w ork programme can virtually eliminate abject poverty in India at
a modest cost.

Experienc e with food aid in several other countries is

also briefly discussed .
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1.

Introdu ction
Any form of aid from one agent (indivi dual, househ old, nation) to

anothe r is an unrequ ited transfe r from the former to the latter.

Yet the

donor may often expect or receive some favors from the recipie nt in
other
forms (e.g. politic al conces sions or suppor t in exchang e for econom
ic
aid).

Aid need not always be benefi cial to the recipie nt nor need it

involve some sacrifi ce on the part of the donor.

Some have sugges ted

that develop ing countr ies, in accepti ng econom ic aid, have in effect
obtaine d short-t erm benefi ts at the cost of long-te rm depend ency.

Others

argue that aid (in which one should also include loans at conces sionary
terms) from governm ents and multil ateral agencie s is in large part
a
correc tion of the imperf ect interna tional market s for capita l and
risk
sharing and shiftin g.

Of course human itarian concern s for the poor in

develop ing countr ies and the desire to reduce tension s and politic
al
instab ility arising from econom ic depriv ation are also among donor
object ives.

Beside s objecti ves of donors and the impacts on recipie nts,

there are issues relatin g to quality of aid (whethe r it is tied to
projec ts, commo dities or to purcha ses from donors, or it is comple
tely
unfette red program aid) and its effecti veness in achievi ng whatev er
objeciv es the donors and recipie nts expecte d to achieve .

Two very

interes ting recent studies , Gassen (1984) and Kruege r and Ruttan (1983),
explore the larger concern s about aid in depth.

This paper is limited to

food aid and its role in further ing econom ic develop ment of poor
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countries .

Food aid can also be helpful in alleviati ng adverse impacts on

the poor of structura l and sectoral adjustmen t programs that many
developin g countries are undertaki ng.

Some of the ground is well covered

in the voluminou s literatur e on food aid (Hopkins (1984, 1987), Mellor and
Ezekiel (1987), World Food Programme (1983, 1985), Wallerste in (1980) to
mention only a select few). It is hoped that this paper will add some
insights to those available in them.

For an iconoclas tic analysis of

hunger, see Lappe and Collins (1977).
Food aid by definitio n is commodity tied aid: it makes available
certain quantitit es of one or more commodit ies (foodgrai ns, edible oils
and fats, dairy products etc) at concessio nal terms, if not as outright
gifts, to recipient s.

Food aid, other than as emergency relief when

famines or other abnormal circumsta nces arise, is of two forms: project
aid, where food aid is tied to the implemen tation of projects mutually
agreed upon by the donor and recipient , and untied program aid.

If a

project is defined broadly enough to include policy reforms or changes,
then the so-called policy condition al food aid would be covered under
project aid.

I will discuss emergency food aid for relief of famines and

natural disasters only briefly.

My concern is mainly with longer term

food aid.
Hopkins (1984) points out that food aid has evolved from its inception
in the fifties as a means for disposal of food surpluses in donor
countries to a policy tool for promoting economic developme nt in the
recipient countries in the eighties.

The volume of food aid has

fluctuate d reaching a low ironicall y during the food crisis of 1973-74.
The recovery since then has not restored the volume to the levels of the
mid-sixti es.

Table 1 provides the relevant data.

USA was essential ly .the only food aid donor.
emerged as a significa nt donor.

In the mid-sixti es the

By the mid-eigh ties EEC has

In large part this reflects the growth of
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food surpluse s in the EEC as a conseque nce of its common agricul tural
policy of price support and protecti on of agricult ure within EEC and the
reductio n in US food stocks.

Thus, surplus disposa l as an objectiv e has

not complet ely disappea red from the food aid scene.

Even though

liberali zation of agricul tural trade is one of the items on the agenda of
the ongoing Uruguay round of multila teral trade negotia tions and the costs
of domestic agricul tural subsidy program s are spiralli ng in the US and
EEC, it is unlikely that either the program s or the surpluse s will
disappe ar anytime soon.
Food aid can further economic developm ent of develop ing countrie s
through several channel s: first and foremos t, just as any form of aid it
adds resource s that can be used for current consump tion or accumul ation;
second, it provides balance of payment s support just as any other form of
foreign aid; third, as food aid, it augments the domestic availab ility of
food (though not necessa rily on a one-to-o ne basis); fourth, to the extent
it is targeted at the poor it can alleviat e poverty which is a major goal
of economic developm ent. By improvin g the health and nutritio nal status of
the poor it augment s their human capital and future income earning
capabil ity; fifth, food aid tied to develop ment-or iented projects that
would not have been undertak en otherwis e, promotes developm ent; and sixth,
to the extent it can be credibly tied to the initiati on of
growth-p romoting policies and reform, if not abandone ment, of policies
detrime ntal to growth, it can obvious ly promote developm ent.

This last

role can be importa nt in the structu ral adjustm ent process . Adjustm ent to
unantic ipated shocks as well as reform of
politica l and economic costs.

entrench ed policies involve

Externa l aid, includin g food aid, can in

some situatio ns increase the credibi lity of reforms by alleviat ing these
costs.

The operativ e word in all the above is "can" and not "will."
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Table 1
Cereal Aid by Princip al Donors
(Million tons)

Donor

1965-66

1967-68

1972-73

1974-75

1984-85

Austral ia

0.19

0.26

0.33

0.48

Canada

0.80

0.81

0.61

0.94

0.99

1.41

2.47

EEC
USA

17.32

13.50

6.95

4. 72

7.54

TOTAL

17.73

16.22

9.96

8.40

12.52

(includi ng others)

Source: Food And Agricul ture Organiz ation (1985) Food Aid in Figures ,
Rome.
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Whether the potential of food aid for furtherin g developme nt will be
realized in full measure depends on the flexibili ty with which it is used,
whether other objective s of donors conflict with the objective of economic
developme nt, and whether the domestic, economic, political and
institutio nal environme nt in recipient countries is conducive to efficient
utilizatio n of food aid as a developme nt tool.
Section 2 is devoted to the analytics of food aid.

In Section 3 the

impact of global agricultu ral trade liberaliz ation is taken up.

Since

surplus disposal has been an objective of food aid and the emergence of
agricultu ral surpluses in the developed (and even in some developin g)
countries is a consequen ce of protectio n, it is worth analyzing the costs
and benefits to developin g countries of a liberal trade regime in
agricultu re.

It is also worthwhil e to see what extent additiona l food

availabil ity in the global market, as contraste d with targeted aid, will
improve nutrition al status in developin g countries through reduced world
prices of food.

This section will draw on the simulatio ns from the Basic

Linked System of Models (BLS) of the Food and Agricultu re Project of the
Internati onal Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA).

In Section

4, the India model of the BLS is used to analyze the impact on the poor of
an expansion of the subsidize d system of public distribut ion of foodgrain s
and of the so-called food-for-w ork program in which rural labor from poor
household s are employed in slack agricultu ral seasons in creating public
works (roads, irrigatio n works, schools, etc) and paid in kind (at least
in part) with foodgrain s.

These simulatio ns are of some interest, since

one of the more important objective s of food aid is poverty ameliorat ion
and improveme nt of nutrition al status, and food-for-w ork programs are
prime examples of projects to which food aid is tied.

Section 5 briefly
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reviews some salient features of the experience with food aid.

Section 6

concludes the paper with few remarks on past experience with food aid and
policy implication s for the future.

2.

Some Simple Analytics of Food Aid
The standard work horse of internation al trade theory, the two

commodity general equilibrium model, can be used to illustrate some of the
analytical issues involved in food aid, as indeed, Bhagwati (1986) did to
great effect.

We reproduce and extend his analysis below.

Consider a

country producing and consuming two aggregate commodities , food and
non-food.

The production possibility frontier (PPF) of this country is AB

in Figure 1.

The preferences of its citizens are represented by a set of

Samuelson social indifferenc e curves (SIC).

Assume, to begin with, that

the country is in autarkic equilibrium with its production and consumption
at P0

,

where the SIC represented by CC touches the PPF.

The equilibrium

domestic relative price of food in terms of non-food is the common slope
of the PPF and SIC at P0

•

The common tangent is shown as PP.

Suppose the

country (its government) is offered food aid, gratis, in the amount AAl.
What will be its effect on domestic prices, production and welfare?

Of

course, the answer will depend on how the recipient government responds to
aid and/or conditions, if any, that the donor imposes on the recipient.

2.1.

Incentive Effects
(a) Suppose the government sells the food received as aid in the

open market and returns the sale proceeds to consumers as lump sum income
transfers.

The resulting equilibrium can be derived by shifting the PPF

to the right by the distance AAl so that the domestic availabilit y curve
with aid is AAlBl.

If the domestic price remained unchanged as the
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Figure 1

Non-,Food

A

p

0

Food
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slope of PP (hereafter referred simply as price PP), output will be at po
A

AA
so that domestic availabilit y is at A at which the slope of the tangent PP

to the availabilit y curve MlBl also equals the price PP.

If we assume

for simplicity that social preferences are homothetic, demand at price PP
A

and disposable income OP in terms of food (including the value of food and
received as lump sum transfers) will be cl.

Thus, there will be an excess

supply (demand) of food (non-food) forcing relative food prices down.
Equilibrium obtains at the point A1 to the left of Al on the availabilit y
curve at which an SIC (not shown) touches it.

The correspondi ng

production point is pl on the PPF to the left of P0
P0

,

•

Comparing pl with

it is seen that the equilibrium domestic relative price of food (i.e.

the slope of PPF at pl) has fallen and so has the output food.

This

illustrates the oft-cited production disincentiv e effect of food aid.
this undesirable and inevitable?

The answer is clearly no.

Is

Before we

illustrate other possibiliti es, let us note that even though domestic
price of food and its output have fallen, consumer welfare at cl is
clearly higher than at P0

•

With the use of lump sum transfers to counter

any adverse income distributio nal effects among citizens, and given that
aid is a transfer that augments the commodity availabilit y set of the
economy, it can only improve social welfare.

That is, gainers from aid,

i.e. consumers as a whole and non-food producers, can fully compensate the
losers, i.e. food producers, and still gain.

Thus the fall in the

relative price of food and its output have not led to any undesirable
consequence s in this illustration .
Suppose the government wishes to maintain producer incentives while
absorbing food aid by not allowing domestic relative price to fall from
PP.

A
To be able to do this, consumers have to be in equilibrium at A.

They will be, if the relative price of food facing them is the slope of
A

the SIC passing through A.

Clearly this price will be lower than PP.
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The reason is that price PP is also the same as the slope of PP.
A

AA

C1 both lie on PP.

A

A and

AA

Al
Since an SIC touches PP at C
, the slope of an SIC

Al
passing through AA which is to the right of C
(i.e. involving more

consumpti on of food than at cl) has to be smaller.

This implies that a

food subsidy for consumers (or equivalen tly a tax on non-food) will be
A

called for to ensure consumpti on at A.

With this distortio nary wedge

between consumer and producer prices, it is not surprisin g that consumer
welfare at A (where an SIC intersect s AAlBl)) is lower than at Al (where
an SIC touches AAlBl)), but of course higher than at P0

•

If the

intervent ion is in the form of a consumpti on tax on non-food, the problem
of financing does not arise--th e tax revenue as well as the proceeds from
food aid are returned to consumers as lump sum transfers .
follows (Figure 2).

This is seen as

Value of consumpti on in terms of untaxed food (at Al)

at consumer prices= OTl = Value of productio n at producer prices OT 0 (=
factor income)+ Taxes on non-food consumpti on T0 T0 + Value of food aid

T0 Tl.

Tax revenue equals T0 T0 because the value of non-food

consumpti on (P 0 Q0 ) at tax inclusive consumer prices is Q0 T0
value at producer prices is Q0 T0

,

,

while its

the differenc e being the tax revenue.

Suppose taxing non-food consumpti on is infeasibl e.

Then food

cnsumptio n has to be subsidize d--thus, part of the value of food aid (at
domestic prices) is used up in financing the subsidy and the rest is
transferr ed to consumers in a lump sum.

Thus, ovl, the value of

consumpti on at domestic consumer prices in terms of non-food = Value of
productio n at producer prices ov0
Value of food aid vovl.

-

Food consumpti on subsidy vlvo +

Food subsidy equals vlv 0 since the value of

food consumpti on at subsidize d prices equals R0 vl, while its value at
producer prices is R0 v 0

.

It is also obvious that producer incentive s could have been maintaine d

I.
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through a production subsidy on food relative to the consumer price at A

or equivalentl y a production tax on non-food.

Again when a subsidy

instrument is used only that part of the value of food aid net of subsidy
is transferred to consumers in lump sum.
case.

For completenes s, take the first

Here the value of consumption in terms of non-food ovl = Value of

production at consumer prices ov 0 + Production Subsidy v 0 v 0

-

Value of

food aid vlvo.
The essential points of these illustration s are simply these: food aid
being an unrequited transfer adds to domestic resources and at the same
time, adds to domestic food availabilit y.

Under laissez-fai re, with

prices unchanged, since the additional resources will not be all spent on
food, relative price of food has to fall to absorb the additional food.
However, consumer welfare will unambiguous ly rise.

An interventio n is

needed if the price fall is to be prevented or mitigated.

If this

interventio n takes the form of a food consumption subsidy or an equivalent
production subsidy, part of the additional resources will be used up in
financing the subsidy.

This distortion- creating interventio n will reduce

the welfare gain from food aid compared to laissez-fai re, but the gain is
still positive.

Thus the fall in food prices with aid is neither

undesirable , if it occurs as in the laissez faire situation, nor is it
inevitable, since it can be prevented through government interventio n
albeit at some welfare cost.
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2.2

Mitigating Price Inflation

It is sometimes suggested that food aid, far from creating a
(production ) disincentiv e effect due to a fall in relative price of food,
will in fact help mitigate price inflation that would have come about in
its absence.

Implicit in this argument is the assumption that food aid

alleviates an incipient excess demand at the initial prices.

Presumably

the excess demand arises because the government expands development
expenditure without at the same time raising the needed resources through
taxes.

It is not always made clear whether the argument is about general

price inflation or about the possible rise in relative price of food (i.e.
food price inflation).

We will illustrate both versions, although

illustratin g nominal price inflation using a real model and diagram is a
bit clumsy: in what follows nominal flows and real flows are both measured
in the same axis and the underlying monetary system and behaviour are left
implicit.
Consider first the case when the government wishes to acquire goods
worth T0 Tl (see Figure 3) in terms of food at the initial prices, say, for
public investment.

Given our homothetici ty assumption, if it levies a

lump sum tax equal to T0 T1 in terms of food, private consumption will
move to cl with no change in prices and the government would have
acquired the resources.

Suppose such taxation is infeasible but the

government nevertheles s attempts to acquire these resources by adding to
aggregate spending in the amount T0 Tl (where T0 Tl
aggregate spending in nominal terms is OTl.

T0 Tl) so that

Assume that the composition

of government demand in terms of food and non-food is the same as private
demand. Aggregate demand at nominal expenditure oTl and at initial prices
will then move to cl, while output stays put at P0
demand for both goods.

,

thus creating excess

With nominal income of consumers (and nominal

-13Non-Food

Food
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expenditure of government) both unchanged at OT 0 and T0 Tl respectivel y, a
nominal price inflation (in the ratio T0 Tl/oTl) will push real aggregate
expenditure back to OT 0 and equilibrium is restored.

However, the

government acquires only a proportion, OT 0 /oTl, of the resources it wished
to acquire through the "inflation tax."

Of course, it could have acquired

real resources equal to T0 Tl if its nominal expenditure has been set at a
level that would have produced real revenues through the inflation tax of
that order.
Before turning to aid tied to food, let us dispose of a simpler case
of untied aid. If non-food aid is also available, if the government
received both commodities in amounts equal to the difference between cl
and OP 0

,

then clearly there will be no price inflation--o Tl will in fact

be real expenditure (and not nominal expenditure ). The. government acquires
the resources it needs entirely through aid.
Food aid, being tied to food, will not enable the government to
acquire non-food it needs for its investment without intervening in the
domestic market.

Assume, for simplicity, that the commodity composition

of government investment is flexible so that the set of investment
"isoquants" are the same as the set consumer indifferenc e curves and the
government maximizes the 'quantity' of investment given its expenditure
and the relative price of food.

Then, with food aid in the amount BBl

becoming available, by letting the relative price of non-food to rise,
equilibrium is established with aggregate use at cl and production at pl
(Figure 3).

Private consumption will be at clP, the difference betwen cl

and clP represents government investment bundle.

Of course, if the

relative price of non-food for producers (or consumers) is to be kept
unchanged, then as earlier an appropriate indirect tax or subsidy will be
needed as an additional instrument and part of the aid may be used up in
financing a subsidy.
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2.3 Usual Marketing Requirement s or Additionali ty
Let us now turn to the more realistic world in which the economy
receiving fo~d aid is open to internation al trade.

To keep matters

simple, let us avoid incentive issues discussed above by assuming the
economy is a price taker in world markets and is rationally following a
free trade policy.
P0

,

In the pre-aid equilibrium (Figure 4) production is at

consumption is at c 0 (with the slope of P0 c 0 representin g the relative

price of food in world markets).

Food imports equal c 0 o 0

.

Suppose now

food aid in the amount T0 Tl becomes available. With prices unchanged
(because of free trade), production remains at P0

,

availabilit y moves to

Al and consumption moves to cl (under homothetic ity).
to clol.

Food imports rise

However clol is less than the sum of the pre-aid commercial

imports c 0 n° and food aid T0 Tl.

Thus, part of food aid has been used to

replace commercial imports.
Food aid donors would not wish to see their commercial sales reduced
as a consequence of food aid.

For this reason they impose what are called

"usual marketing requirement s" (UMR) as a condition for providing food
aid.

These can take various forms. But for simplicity assume that the

donors require that the recipient country continue to import at least as
much as she did from commercial channels prior to food aid.

This means,

given the aid, total imports (aid plus commercial) has to be at least c 0 o 0

+ T0 Tl.

As is well-known from the theory of non-economi c objectives

(Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969)) the optimum policy to absorb food imports
exceeding the level that would obtain under laissez faire is to have an
import subsidy.

This means that the domestic price of food will fall

below world prices, thereby discouragin g (encouragin g) domestic production
(consumptio n) of food sufficientl y to increase imports of food
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to the required extent.

In Figure 4 an import subsidy on food moves the

production point to p2 from P0

,

thus lowering (raising) the output of food

(non-food), availabilit y to A2 and consumption to c2 on the world price
line through A2 at which the slope of SIC is the same as the subsidy
inclusive domestic price (that is, the same as the slope of the PPF at
pl).

Food imports c2n2 now equals pre-aid imports c 0 n° plus food aid.

Such a policy minimizes the welfare loss (relative to laissez faire)
associated with meeting UMR.
This brings to the fore a possible conflict between the two objectives
of the donors, namely between the desire to see incentives for food
production in the recipient country not being adversely affected and the
desire to see that export markets for food for donors are not adversely
affected by aid.

UMR serves the latter objective at the expense of the

former if the optimal response of the recipient country through an import
subsidy reduces the domestic price of food there.

Of course, if the

donors insist on both objectives being met, they will force the recipient
country to use the policy of a food consumption subs.idy rather than the
first-best import subsidy, thereby imposing on it a further welfare loss
relative to laissez-fai re.

2.4.

Food Aid and Nutritional Improvement of the Nutritional Status
of the Poor

One of the objectives of food aid on the part of donors is the desire
to improve the income and nutritional status of the poor in recipient
countries thorugh some forms of targeted food aid.

To explore this set of

issues, let us utilize a partial equilibrium analysis as contrasted with
the general equilibrium analysis of the earlier sections.

On the other

hand, let us be more general in another direction by considering the
global food market.

More specificall y, let us aggregate all donors of

food aid into one and all recipients into another, with the former

-17·Non-Food
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exporting food to the latter.

Let us distingui sh two distinct groups of

consumers within the recipient region: the poor who have fairly price
elastic demand and the rich who have fairly inelastic demand.

Again for

simplicit y, assume that there is no domestic productio n of food in the
recipient region.

For the sake of variety let us illustrat e with

numerica lly specified export supply and demand functions rather than with
diagrams!
The export supply function of the donor region is 0.9 + p, where pis
the price per unit.

The demand functions of the rich and poor

respectiv ely are 10 -.Olp, 0 s p s 100 and 2 - .lp, 0 s p s 20.

In free

trade with no aid the market clears at a price of 10, with donor region
exporting 10.9 uni;ts of which 9.9 units are consumed by the rich and 1
unit by the poor in the recipient region.

Suppose now the farm lobby in

the donor region succeeds in raising the domestic price of food (by a
'modest' 5.5%) to 10.55.

Export surplus goes up to 11.45.

Were this is

to be "dumped" in the recipient country market, the price would fall by
50% to 5, with the consumpti on of the rich going up to 9.95 and the poor
to 1.50.

Thus, export revenue would fall from 109 to 57.25!

The cost to

the donor country treasury of acquiring and dumping the surplus arising
out of the domestic price increase would be (10.55 - 5) x 11.45 = 63.5475.
Policy makers in donor countries begin thinking that there must be better
ways of disposing of .the surplus created by their domestic price policy
than to dump it in world markets!

One such idea is food aid tied to its

being used for the 'poor' in the recipient country.
The donor offers 1.55 units of the surplus food free to the recipient
country to be sold to the poor, the resulting revenues being kept by the
recipient country governmen t.
sold to the rich.

The rest of the surplus, i.e. 9.9 units is

Assuming that the markets in which the poor and rich

buy their food are segmented so that the transactio ns cost for the poor

-19reselling to the rich at a higher price what they buy in their market are
prohibitive , the sale in the rich market will yield a price of 10.

Thus

the price paid by the rich, and their consumption are the same as in the
free trade equilibrium . The consumption of the poor rises by 55% to 1.55,
the price they pay also falls by 55% to 4.5 as compared to the free trade
equilibrium .

The donors realize a revenue of 10 x 9.9 = 99 on the sales

to the rich, thereby reducing the cost of their domestic price support
program to 21.7975 from 63.5475, a reduction of more than 65%.

The

recipient country government realizes a revenue of 6.975 from the sale of
food aid to the poor.

Thus, in the recipient country, with aid, the rich

are just as well off as in the free trade situation, the poor much better
off and the government acquires revenues.

As compared to the hypothetica l

equilibrium with dumping, in the aid equilibrium in the recipient region
poor are better off, the rich marginally worse off (their food consumption
under dumping would have been higher by .05 units or 5%), and the
government is better off (it gets no revenue under dumping).

The donor

government, given that it has to raise domestic prices, is better off. in
the aid equilibrium compared to dumping, since it saves over 65% on the
cost of price support!
The essence of the above example is that by inducing the recipient
country to isolate the market with more elastic demand, i.e. the poor
market, with the carrot of food aid and the right to keep the revenue from
sales to the poor, the donor government achieves price discriminat ion.
Indeed, it can do even better by giving the poor 2 units of food free of
charge and selling the remaining 9.45 units to the rich at a whopping
price of 55 (a jump of 550% over the price in free trade) and realize a
revenue of 519.75 and make a profit of 420.9975!

Clearly, the rich in the

recipient country will strenuously resist such gouging!

Achieving price

discriminat ion through food aid with the consent and cooperation of the
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recipient country government is the next best thing to gouging!

Be that

as it may, there is no reason to believe that monopolisti c exploitatio n as
ever the motivation of those who thought of food aid tied to the poor in
recipient country as a less costly way of dealing with surpluses than
dumping.

However, that the cost saving in surplus disposal was achieved

essentially through price discriminat ion is a realistic presumption .

2.5

Project Tying, Commodity Composition of Aid, and Use of Counterpart
Funds
Food aid by definition is tied aid: it is tied to a commodity or set

of food commodities given as aid.

However, as we saw earlier, if there

are no onerous usual marketing requirement s and as long as the recipient
country imports these commodities commerciall y and the volume of aid is
not too large relative to commercial imports, commodity tying is of no
consequence . Sometimes food aid is tied to particular projects, such as
food for work projects (more on this below) in which part or a whole of
the wages of workers employed in such projects are paid in kind with food
received under food aid.

There is no evidence to suggest that the

availabilit y of food aid led to the choice and implementat ion of projects
that should not have been chosen.

In any case, if projects proposed for

implementat ion are evaluated using techniques of social cost-benefi t
analysis in which food aid is valued at its social opportunity cost, the
availabilit y of food aid per se will not necesarily make a project (that
would not have been socially worthwhile if food were to be commerciall y
imported) pass the social cost-benefi t test.
obtained

The social cost of food

through aid has to be sufficientl y below its commercial import

cost to bring it about.
Food aid, originating as it did with the accumulated surpluses in
donor countries, is more often than not offered in commodities which
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happen to be in surplus, mainly wheat, rice, corn, yellow maize and dairy
products.

As most of these commodities are internationally traded, the

fact that aid comes in a particular commodity composition need not create
any special problem to the recipent if onerous usual marketing
requirements are not imposed 'as part of aid.

By substituting for

commercial imports or exports appropriately, aid can be absorbed without
any domestic production effect.

Even if the recipient country does not

trade, as long as there are substitution possibliities either in the
domestic production and consumption basket, aid can be absorbed by
suitably altering the domestic production and consumption baskets through
appropriate price changes.

Of course, a problem can arise if conditions

imposed on the recipient preclude trading part or whole of the aid given
in one commodity for others needed and if there are absolutely no
substitution possibilities in production and consumption.

An example of

such aid is yellow maize offered to Kenyans who prefered white maize.
Since the same donor often provides aid to many countries with differing
preferences and production possibilities, by permitting the recipients to
exchange commodities received in aid for others which they can supply, the
utility of aid to each recipient can be enhanced without affecting the
donor's interests.

Indeed, if such a swap can be planned ahead, some

saving in transportation and other tansaction costs can be attained as
well.
A potentially more serious problem arising from food aid is the change
in consumption preferences in the long run in the recipient country
towards the commodities supplied as aid.

Although a shift towards

imported 'superior' cereals (wheat and rice) supplied by aid and way from
domestically produced 'inferior' coarse grains has been observed in West
Africa (Delgado and Miller (1985)), as Mellor and Ezekiel (1987) point out
that this shift may be simply a reflection of higher Engel elasticity for
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wheat and rice, in addition to the effect of lowered price of wheat and
rice brought about in part for absorbing aid.

In other words, the shift

in commodity composition of consumption reflects the same preferences
(i.e. set of indifference maps), and changing budget constraints (prices
and incomes) rather than a change in the preferences.
The possible real problem is not the shift in consumption patterns or
preferences but the fact that the continuance of food aid in the
indefinite future is uncertain, and even if it continues, its volume will
certainly fluctuate.
unanticipated fashion.

Thus, food aid can be cut or withdrawn in an
If the resources allocated away from the

production of commodities supplied under aid to others cannot be flexibly
be reallocated without excessive cost, then foreign exchange will have to
be spent to import commodities when they are no longer supplied or
supplied in smaller volumes under aid.

In other words, unanticipated

withdrawal of food aid constitutes an adverse shock to which the economy
will have to adjust. And as with adjustment to any adverse (favourable)
shock, the greater the flexibility with which resources can be reallocated
the lower will be the social cost (greater will be the social benefit) of
adjustment.

There is sustantial evidence (Balassa (1985)) that economies

which have maintained a neutral foreign trade regime between earning
foreign exchange through export promotion and saving foeign exchange
through import subsitution beyond that would have been dictated by dynamic
comparative advantage considerations, have not only achieved efficient and
rapid economic growth but have weathered bettter the adverse oil and
interest rate shocks since 1973.

Apart from the foreign trade regime,

domestic distortions of various kinds, including those adversely affecting
producer incentives in agriculture, and capability to respond to changing
economic environment, including in particular to the availability of new
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technologies, can impose high and avoidable social costs of adjustment.
Most of the above analysis was based on the assumption that food aid
was an unrequited transfer.

In reality this is not quite so.

Until 1972

or so, the revenues generated in recipient country's currency (the
so-called counterpart funds) by the sale of food aid received under US
Public Law 480 Title I were put in some special accounts, the disbursal
from which was governed by agreements between the US and recipient country
governments.

In effect the value of food aid was a US asset, albeit in

local currency, but over the use of which the recipient had some say.
Part of it was used for some US embassy expenses and part as a grant for
investment on agreed projects.

To the extent such expenses would have

been incurred and such projects would have been aided even if counterpart
funds were not available, use of local currency assets for such purposes
meant that foreign exchange that would otherwise have accrued to the
recipient did not.

Thus, the foreign exchange saved by the recipient to

the extent food aid replaced commercial food imports was 'lost' later in
the sense of potential foreign exchange inflow foregone.
In cases where the project would not have been aided but for the
availability of US assets in local currency, nor undertaken by the
recipient in the absence of aid, the undertaking of the project adds to
domestic demand which would have been otherwise absent, thereby adding to
inflationary pressures usually present in many developing countries.

Even

otherwise since the use of accumulated counterpart funds is not associated
with any fresh inflow of food or other commodities from abroad, some have
argued that it is inflationary.

In India there was an extensive debate on

PL480 aid (Rath and Patvardhan (1967), Shenoy (1974)) and in particular on
the inflationary potential of the use of PL480 funds and also whether the
deposits of such funds in special accounts added to the money supply
growth thereby adding another source of potential inflation [Sundaram
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mostly because, whether or not the inflationary potential, if any, was
realized depended on the assumptions one made about the actions
(accomodating or sterilising) of the Indian government and monetary
authorities.

2.6

Food Aid Dependency, Neglect of Agriculture and Long-Term
Development

The permanent shift in consumption preferences towards commodities
supplied as aid is only one example of alleged long-term deleterious
consequences of food aid.

One such consequence is said to be the

complacency on the part of the recipient with a poorly performing
agricultural sector, if not outright discrimination in favour of other
sectors, in the confident expectation that food aid will be forthcoming to
solve any emerging food problems, an attitude, it is claimed, that can be
changed only by withdrawing food aid or by making it costly, politically,
if not economically.

For example, it has been

suggested that the

availability of cheap food under PL 480 enabled Indian policy makers to
neglect agriculture and pursue an import substituting industrializati on
strategy emphasizing heavy industry at the same time keeping the vocal
urban population, including industrial workers and the bureaucracy, happy
with public distribution of subsidized food and other essential
commodities,

It is also claimed that President Johnson's blackmailing

India so to speak by approving PL-480 shipments on a month-to-month basis
while India was threatened with famine after two successive years of
unprecedented drought in 1965-66 and 1966-67 ostensibly to change India's
stance towards the Vietnam War convinced Indian policy makers of the
dangers of food aid dependency and that the political cost of the neglect
of agriculture was too high.

In this version of history Indian policy

-25-

makers dramatically shifted the incentives in favour of agriculture, the
green revolution was facilitated and, lo and behold, India exported food
in the late eighties!

However, great this version may be of satisfaction

to the players of aid hardball in Washington and equally to those in India
who would like claim that they were responsible for putting India out of
the reach of food blackmailers, the facts are more prosaic.

As I showed

elsewhere (Srinivasan 1986), the available data do not support the
contention that agricultural sector was much more favoured by Indian
economic planners in the period since the mid-sixties than before in terms
of allocation of investment.

Nor is there any evidence for any

significant change in the trend rate of growth of output of foodgrains or
for that matter real agricultural output as a whole between the two
periods.

What did happen is a change in the components of growth,

relatively larger proportion in the later period being accounted for by
improvements in yield per hectare of cropped area and a smaller proportion
by expansion of area.

Of course, as is to be expected, the performance of

different crops was not the same, with the growth in output of wheat (and
to a lesser extent, rice) being substantially faster in the later period
because of the adoption of the green revolution technology.

This also

suggests, that if indeed the planners shifted resources towards
agriculture in the later periods, it may have been a rational response to
the rightward shift in the marginal productivity of investment schedule
for agriculture because of the green revolution, a technology that became
available only in the mid-sixties.
The aid dependency argument is a multifaceted one.

At the aggregate

level, in an extreme form, it suggests that all foreign aid is used to
substitute on a one-to-one basis for domestic savings, so that aggregate
investment and hence the growth rate of aggregate output is unchanged.
Thus, aid is simply consumed.

Even in this form the implied behaviour of
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If aid

(by which I mean the unrequited transfer element in external resource
inflow) is confidently expected to be permanent, it is like an added
permanent income flow.
consumed.

And theory would suggest that it be largely

At the sectoral level, the argument has been stated earlier:

availabilit y food aid will either reduce producer prices and hence
incentives to produce food and to invest in the capacity to produce food
or simply end up increasing consumption of food (not necessarily on a
one-to-one basis) with no impact on prices or incentives: As we saw in
Section 2.1, both of these are essentially rational responses to a
permanent availabilit y of food aid.
There is one form dependency argument that may make some sense: the
recipient country embarks on a development strategy that is rational were
aid to be permanent but in fact, aid is not, so that at some stage in the
development process the country is faced with a cessation or reduction of
aid that it did not anticipate.

As argued above, this is equivalent to an

adverse shock on an economy that has geared its resource allocation
intertempor ally to aid availabilit y (i.e. had become dependent on aid!)
and as such, suffers a cost of adjustment whose size will vary with the
flexibility and efficiency of resource allocation.

But unless the

recipient's expectation s about permanence of aid were irrational and not
based on all available information about aid flows, it is a misuse of the
term, to call the adverse consequence of unanticipat ed aid curtailment as
the effect of aid dependency.

On the other hand, if despite all the

available information to the contrary, a recipient chose to act as if aid
was permanent, it is this irrationali ty, rather than aid dependency, that
is responsible for the inevitable cost of adjustment when aid ceases.
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Famines and Food Aid

Famine, according to the 1955 edition of the Oxford Universal
Dictionary, means an instance of extreme and general scarcity of food, and
in its transferred figuritive use, hunger and hence starvation.

Yet not

having enough food to feed everybody (i.e. general scarcity) does not mean
everyone will starve.

Equally, having enough food or more (i.e. absence

of scarcity) to feed everybody does not mean that

rumg_

will starve.

Unless an individual has access to available food, directly or indirectly
through having other things he can exchange for food, he is likely to
starve regardless of food availabilit y in the aggregate.

This rather

elementary and obvious point has been elaborately and elegantly made by
Sen (1981).

As documented by him, the Bengal famine of 1943, Bangladesh

famine of 1974 and the Ethiopian famine of 1974 were not associated with
any rapid decline in food availabilit y.

The Chinese famine of 1959-61 in

which more than 20 million people are estimated to have died had much less
to do with food availabilit y shortfall and more to do with her political
and economic system.

Merely augmenting food availabiity per se through

emergency food aid whenever an episode of famine is threatened may not be
adequate to prevent starvation, let alone reduce the chances of future
occurrence of famines.

However, an overwhelmin g proportion of the world's

poor depend on agricuture for their employment and income.

As such, a

serious crop failure erodes their incomes, and given the imperfectio n in
credit and asset markets, they cannot borrow or sell their meagre assets
to finance consumption except at high cost.

In such circumstanc es, food

(whether from foreign aid or from other crop failure free regions of the
country) can be used for relief and food-for-wo rk programs to employ those
who can work and mass starvation can be avoided.

Equally, if

food-for-wo rk programs financed by food aid are used even in normal years
to employ rural labour in slack seasons in building irrigation works and
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failure can be reduced in the long run.

Mellor and Gavian (1987) provide

an incisive analysis of these issues.

2.8.

The Role of Food Aid in the Adjustment Process

An important role for an expanded and more purposely used and sharply
focused program of food in support of the "adjustment process" in
developing countries has attracted attention, particularly in
international bureaucracies involved in food aid (World Food Program
(1987).

Since by "adjustment" one means painful adjustment, anything that

eases the pain will be welcomed by the adjustors.

Analytically, there is

nothing in food aid to suggest that it will ease the pain more than any
other aid!

If adjustment in the sense of reforming the policy framework,

incentive structures and resource allocation mechanisms so as to enable
the economy to perform efficiently and equitably in a changed external
economic environment can be achieved without sacrificing growth, it is of
course desirable.

However, if the need for adjustment arises in large

part from past policies that would not have been sustainable for long even
if there had been no change in external environemnt, adjustment will
necessarily involve sacrifices and even a pause in growth.

In such

circumstances, policy reform will not be credible (i.e. it will not remain
in place for long if initiated) because the short-run resource
reallocation and hardship will be too severe to permit political survival
of the reforming regime.

The availability of additional resources to the

required extent to ease the pain of adjustment could bring credibility to
reforms.

It must be emphasized that this is a political and not

necessarily economic argument--the reason is that the threat to political
survival usually arises either because those who have to bear the burden
of adjustment are politically powerful or because the burden is
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inequitably distributed and not necessarily because the burden is too
onerous if it is equitably shared, economically and politically.

It also

raises another troublesome issue: if development strategies pursued led to
the crisis and not changes in external environment over which the country
had no control, giving additional aid for adjustment in such a situation
may encourage others to follow politically rewarding but economically
unsustainable development strategies.
Similar considerations apply to food aid tied to policy reform or to
choice of particular projects even if these were not part of an adjustment
program.

If an economy is following an appropriate development strategy

and the social cost of a project exceeds social benefits were food
imported commercially, as argued earlier, a donor may induce the choice of
the project by providing food aid at a sufficiently low social cost to the
recipient.

But if aid is given to reduce the political cost to the regime

in the recipient country to induce it to implement a project the donor
regime prefers (possibly for reaping political benefits at home), the
argument shifts to the political arena.

But to 'bribe', so to speak, the

regime in the recipient country to change bad policies (introduce 'policy
reform') will give the wrong signal to others.

3.

Trade Versus Aid in Combating Hunger: Agricultural Trade
Liberalization or Larger Aid Flows?
There is perhaps no country in the world in which the government does

not intervene in the determination of agricultural output, foreign trade
and prices.

Obviously, interventions that affect a country's imports or

exports, such as quotas, tariffs, voluntary export restrictions or import
expansions not only affect that country but the international market, the
quantitative significance of the effect depending on how large a trader
the country happens to be in world markets.

Less obviously, domestic
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interventions, whether acreage rstrictions, set aside programs, credit
subsidies, price supports etc. affect the international markets as well.
The interventions are so many and

their nature so complex that

disentangling their individual effects is an almost impossible task.
However, their combined effect in in terms of the difference between
domestic and border prices (i.e. c.i.f. import prices or f.o.b. export
prices) can be viewed as a measure of protection.

By this measure average

agricultural protection varied from -19% in Indonesia to a whopping 175%
in Japan during 1975-1976.

Only Australia, New Zealand and Thailand had

negative protection besides Indonesia (Parikh et al (1986)).

Of course,

changes in the protection regime by one or more countries in the global
market will affect all and call for adjustments by each.

One needs a

fairly sophisticated set of general equilibrium models, one for each
country or region, linked together by global market clearing for a
satisfactory analysis of changes in protection levels.

A team of

researchers at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA) put together a system of empirically estimated models,
distinguishing 18 countries, two regions (EEC and the Eastern Bloc) and 15
simpler models for groups of the remaining countries of the world (Parikh
et al (1986), Parikh and Tims (1986)).

The models distinguished 10

commodities: wheat, rice, coarse grains, bovine and ovine meat, other
animal products, dairy products, protein feeds, other food agriculture,
non-food agriculutre and non-agriculture .

The model solved for

equilibrium domestic and international prices sequentially.
simulation period was 1980-2000.

The

A reference simulation of basically

unchanged policies was compared with simulations of policy scenarios
ranging from unilateral trade liberalization by OECD and the developing
countries to multilateral liberalization by all market economies.

In

addition to trade liberalization scenarios, several other scenarios were

-31-

simulated.

In one, grain supplies in the world market are increased

through (a) an extra SO million tons of wheat thrown on the world market
each year, and (b) SO% reduction in the consumption of meat in OECD
countries.

In another, higher prices for producers in developing

countries was assured by reducing OECD output by 2S%.

In contrast with

these scenarios whose impact on the poor works mainly through changes in
market prices facing them, three aid scenarios were simulated.

In

scenario Al, developed countries provide additional aid to the tune of
0.S% of GDP (over and above the present level of about 0.3S%) in the form
of program aid.

Additional aid is distributed to developing countries in

inverse proportion to their per capita incomes.

In scenario A2,

additional aid is given as project-tie d aid to be saved and invested.

The

results of market price mediated and aid mediated scenarios are shown in
Tables 2 and 3 in terms of the number of persons hungry, i.e. not having
nutirtional ly adequate food energy intakes.
These results show that market price mediated effects on hunger in
developing countries are modest.

For example, even though the volume of

additional food needed to raise the food intake of the entire population
of devleoping countries to nutritional adequacy is about SO million tons
of wheat in 2000, simply adding SO million tons of wheat to the market
supplies will reduce the number hungry by only 2%.

The reason is that the

global market systems adjust to the extra wheat put on the market through
price reductions, shift of resources away from wheat etc.

The net result

is that, because of reduction in food output induced by these changes, the
net addition to food consumption is far less than the SO million tons
thrown on the market and the consumption of the poor increases even less.
Interesting ly, given the protection levels in developing countries,
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consumers, particularly the poor, are better off when they liberalize and
worse off and signficantly so when their domestic producer prices are
increased.

Agricultural protection in OECD and the consequent surplus

disposal actually helps the poor in developing countries by reducing world
market prices below what they would have been were there no surpluses.
In contrast to the above, the results in Table 3 show substantial
reductions in hunger, particularly in low income countries when the volume
of aid is increased.

It does not make any difference by year 2000 whether

aid is program aid as project aid.

However, with aid tied to investment,

the time patern of reduction in hunger is different, with only a small
reduction initially, but catching up with program aid by 2000.

More

significantly, the reduction in hunger with project tied aid persists even
if aid is discontinued after 15 years.

4.

Subsidized Food Distribution, Food-For-Work Programs and Hunger in
India
The India model (Narayana et al 1987a, 1987b) of the BLS system of

IIASA models distinguishes 5 different socio-economic groups within the
rural and urban areas of India, each group defined by its monthly
household real consumption expenditure per head.

A household in each

group has a claim on the output of the economy depending on its factor
endowments, and any income transfers from the government and the direct
taxes it pays.

It saves part of its income and spends the rest on

consumption of the ten commodities distinguished in the model, given their
prices, according to a linear expenditure system separately estimated for
each group. The mdoel is thus better equipped to analyze income
distribution issues than representative consumer models.
In the simulations

with the model reported here, India is viewed as a

small open economy facing parametrically given international prices, the
time path of which was taken from the reference scenario of the BLS system
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Table 2
Global Food Market and Hun~er

Scenario

1.

Year

Reference (million persons)

1990

2000

470

400

(Percentage change over
reference scenario)

2.

50% more wheat in the market

-3

-2

3.

50% less meat consumption in OECD

-7

-1

4.

Better producer prices in developing
+11

+9

countries
5.

Agricultura l trade liberalizat ion
(a)

By all market economies

+1

+1

(b)

By developing countries

-5

-5

(c)

By OECD countries

+3

+4

Source:

Parikh and Tims (1986), Box 3.
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Table 3
Aid and Hunger

Country Group

Number Hungry
(millions)
in 2000
Reference Scenario

All Developing Countries

Percent Change Over
Reference Scenario

400

-32

-32

Middle Income

30

0

+ 4

Low-Middle Income

60

-13

- 8

310

-40-

-40

155

-54

-56

Low Income
of which India

Source:

Parikh and Tims (1986), Box 4.
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In the reference scenario a basket of rice, wheat and coarse

grains (in fixed proportions) weighing approximately 135 kgs. is
distributed to all urban residents in each year at a subsidized price
(approximately 20% subsidy).

The foodgrains needed are purchased from

thefarmers at a price below the equlibrium open market price.

Three

alternative distribution policy scenarios are compared with the reference
scenario.

(i) in DO both subsidized public distribution and food purchase

at below market prices from farmers are abolished, (ii) in Dl, 100 kgs. of
wheat is distributed free of charge to all residents of India (rural and
urban), with the cost of procuring the needed grains being financed by
additional income taxes, (iii) in D2, the cost of free distribution of
food is accomodated by a reduction in aggregate investment while keeping
the tax rate fixed at its level in the referene scenario.

The results are

presented in Table 4 in terms of the population in each expenditure group
and its average equivalent expenditure (i.e. the expenditure needed at
1970 prices to achieve the same welfare as is being attained in the
relevant scenario in year 2000).

Thus, equivalent expenditures are

comparable across scenarios.
It is seen from Table 4 that the abolition of the distribution of
subsidized food distribution in urban areas (and the associated implicit
procurement tax on food producers in rural areas) in DO as compared to the
reference scenario, as is to be expected, improves rural income
distribution slightly and worsens the urban distribution.
indicators do not differ much.

The macro

Interestingly, extension of the public

distribution of foodgrains to rural areas, making it completely free and
financing it through an increse in income taxes (levied mainly on the
urban rich) in Dl improves rural income distribution significantly: the
number of persons in the poorest class falls by 57 millions compared to
REF, the number of persons in the middle three income groups rise and the
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Table 4
Impact of Alternative Public Distribution Policies in Year 2000
Exp.
Group
Rural
1
2
3
4
5

147.6
114.0
136.0
154.9
166.0

132.8
261.4
399.1
616.2
1227.3

149.1
113.8
135.2
154.8
165.7

136.3
270.6
413.5
634.3
1233.8

90.6
135.5
154.4
165.8
172.4

153.4
261.4
401.5
613.4
1169.2

97.0
138.9
153.7
169.7
159.2

153.5
261.7
401.9
615.5
1168.1

Urban
1
2
3
4
5

1.5
10.6
41. 2
109.0
167.3

171.8
272.9
394.8
604.9
1223.6

2.4
12.2
42.5
108.0
164.6

169.2
271.6
390.6
596. 7
1199.1

0.6
8.3
39.4
110.4
171.1

171.3
271.2
392.7
596.0
1158.0

0.9
11. 7
47.7
116.4
152.9

170.3
269.6
393.1
600.3
1164.0

REF

p

Macro
Indicator
Real GDP
(Index;
1980=100)

E

DO

p

E

Dl

p

E

D2

p

E

270

270

272

244

Average
Energy Intake
Per Capita
(kcals per
day)
2569

2581

2610

2539

GINI-E

0.3418

0.3100

0.3149

0.3445

P:

Population in millions. Total rural population is 718 millions and urban
population is 330 in all scenarios.

E:

Equivalent Expenditure Per Capita (1970 Rupees).

Source:

An unpublished longer version of Narayana et al (1987a).
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number in richest group falls.

The income distribution in urban areas

also improves though not as dramatically.

With investment kept unchanged,

aggregate growth (i.e. GDP) is essentially unchanged, while the average
energy intake rises and the Gini coefficient of equivalent expenditure
falls.

When the free distribution of food is financed by a reduction in

investment rather than through an increase in taxes as in D2, naturally
aggregate growth is affected--GDP is less by about 10% and the
improvements in income distribution in rural areas are slighty attenuated
compared to Dl.

An implication of the comparison between Dl and D2 is

that if the free distribution of food could be financed through aid,
rather than tax increases, the improvements in Dl as compared to REF would
be even more dramatic.
Rural works programs (RWP) in India are meant to provide gainful
employment to rural workers, particularly during slack seasons, in
creating productive assets.

The facts that the participation in these

programs was voluntary and largely the poor participate are added
advantages in that these enable better targeting of the poor for other
poverty alleviation programs.

However, the execution of these programs

has been criticised on the grounds that the works are often poorly
designed and hence unproductive and that the benefits largely accrue to
non-target groups because of corruption etc.

In specifying rural works

scenarios in the model, the efficiency of design and targeting can be
varied.
More specifically, the two poorest expenditure classes constitute the
target groups.

Each person in these two classes together receives an

average of 100 kgs. of wheat per year as wages for participation in RWP,
while each person in the poorest class receives 125 kg.

Other inputs

besides labor are needed for constructing rural works and the cost of
these inputs are assumed to be 50% of the wage bill.

Half of the works
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created are assumed to be used for agricultural prouction and the other
half for non-agricultur al production.
If the RWP is well designed and executed, the value of the entire
expenditure is translated into assets of equal value.

At the other

extreme, a poorly designed and executed program spends the resources but
creates no productive assets.

Thus, efficiency is defined as the ratio of

the value of assets created to the value of resources spent, and this
ratio 'e' takes two values 1 and 0.

Targeting failure is captured by a

parameter 't' taking the values 1 and .5.

Thus, a proportion 't' of the

wage bill is assumed to reach the two poorest rural expenditure groups
(the target groups) and the remaining (1-t) accrues to all the other rural
classes in proportion to their population.
R-e-t.
program.

Scenarios are designated by

Thus, R-1-1 means a well-designed and well-targeted rural works
The two alternative values fort and e together yield 4

scenarios in all of which the expenditure on rural works is financed by
reducing other investment (compared to the referene scenario) rather than
through increases in taxes.

However, in scenario R-1-1-T the cost of

rural works is financed by additional taxation while keeping investment
unchanged as in the reference scenario.

The results are presented in

Table 4 in terms of the value of the relevant variable in the policy
scenario as a percentage of its value in the reference scenario.
It is clear from Table 5 that rural works programs have a substantial
impact on the poor.

A well-executed and targeted program raises the

equivalent and energy intake of the poorest class by 30% and next poorest
by 40% relative to the reference scenario with no rural works.

With their

cost coming out of investment, aggregate growth is somewhat lower.

As is

to be expected, a poorly executed and well-targeted program sitll yields
the same benefits for the poor--because they are the beneficiaries of the
expenditure on the program.

But spending resources in creating
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Table 5
Impact of Alternative Rural Works Programs

Variable

Scenario*

R-1-1

R-1-0

R-0.5-1

R-0.5-0

R-1-1-T

Average Real GDP Growth
Rate (1980-2000)

95.l

85.6

96.1

87.0

104.3

Average Equivalent
Expenditure Per Capita in 2000:
India

99.8

94.6

100.0

95.3

102.2

Poorest Rural Class

167.0

167.0

133.0

133.0

167.0

Two Poorest Rural Classes

139.0

139.0

119.0

119.0

139.0

India

104.7

102.6

103.0

101.0

105.7

Poorest Rural Class

170.0

170.0

140.0

133.0

170.0

Two Poorest Classes

140.0

140.0

120.0

119.0

140.0

Average Energy Intake Per Capita
(kcals per day) in 2000:

*Each variable is expressed as an index with its reference run value set at
100.

Source:

Narayana et al (1987b).
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R-1-1 with R-1-0 or R-0.5-1 with R-0.5-0).

Targeting failure reduces the

benefits to the poor by nearly a half (compare R-1-1 with R-0.5-1 or R-1-0
with R-0.5-0).

If a well-executed and targeted program can be financed

through additional taxes rather than by reduction in investment, the poor will
benefit as much and the economy will gain growth.

A fortiori, if instead of

addtional taxes, aid becomes available, benefits as well as growth could be
even further augmented.

5.

Food Aid: Some Relevant Experience
food aid in the form of cereals has declined substantially from its peak

in the mid-sixties.

There was a decline of nearly 10 million tons in food aid

by the USA in 1984-85 from a peak of over 17 milion tonnes in 1965-66 (see
Table 1).

This was compensated only partially by the emergence of other

donors, mainly the EEC.

The decline in US aid was mainly due to changes in

the domestic price support program.

Briefly stated, the program, as it

operated until the mid-sixties, contributed to the accumulation of stocks
which reached a peak of over 1.5 billion bushels of wheat or over 118% of all
uses in 1960-61.

In part, as a means of stock disposal, food aid shipments

also grew from under 150 million bushels in the early fifties to a peak of 572
million bushels in 1965.

The so-called 'loan rate,' or basic support price,

was reduced from $2.00 per bushel in 1962 progressively to $1.25 in 1965.
Taken together with other supports, the overall reduction was from $2.00 in
1962 to $1.69 in 1965.

Stocks began declining and with the extraordinary food

aid shipment to India in the two drought years of 1965-66 and 1966-67, they
fell to a low of 513 million bushels in 1966-67 or 36% of all uses. Although
stocks then rose only to fall again to an even lower value of 340 million
bushels in 1974, the year of large sales of wheat to the Soviet Union, they
recovered and surpassed their 1960-61 peak in 1982-83 in absolute terms.
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with 118% in 1960-61.

This was in part due to a rise in domestic consumpmtio n

relative to production, but also due to non-food aid exports, particularl y to
USSR and eastern Europe, becoming significant in the seventies.

Aid shipments

did not recover, and, after falling to a low of 58 million bushels in 1973,
they were back in 1984 to 158 million bushels, a level reached in the fifties.
It must also be added that the terms of US food aid also became harder. For
example, payment in terms of local currency was phased out, the impact of
which can be seen from the fact that in the peak aid year of 1965 nearly 70%
of 512 million bushels of wheat exports under aid programs was sold for
foreign soft currency.

By 1972 none of it was.

Further, recipient countries

had to bear an increasing share of transport and other costs as well.

(Wheat

stock and other data are drawn from several USDA publication s.)
It was mentioned earlier that until the mid-sixties a large fraction of
food aid went to India and Pakistan.

In both countries a development strategy

based on import substitutin g industriali zation was facilitated by cereal
imports under food aid which were used to supply a substantial part of the
subsidized distributio n of grains through ration shops in urban areas.

Such

rationing helped reduce food costs for workers in organized manufacturi ng
industries and in the public sector.

When India experienced two consecutive

droughts of unusual severity in 1965-66 and 1966-67, famine was barely averted
by the importation of over 10 million tonnes of cereals largely under PL480
food aid from USA.

Lele and Agarwal (1987) suggest that the unacceptabl e

political conditiona lity imposed with this aid (see Section 2.6 above) led
Indian authorities to shift resources to agriculture so as to achieve
self-suffici ency in food as quickly as possible and become less vulnerable to
food blackmail.

They also point out that earlier US technical assistance

(government al as well as private, mainly from the Rockefeller and Ford
Foundations ) in setting up agricultura l universitie s and strengtheni ng
research capability in plant breeding, helped India to reap substantial gains
from the green revolution technology that became available in the mid-sixties .

-42As pointed out earlier, the political pressure interpretat ion of US-India
food aid relationshi p is not universally accepted.

For example, India's

ambassador to the USA at that time has denied that any political pressure was
applied along with food aid.

However, the contributio n of agricultura l

universitie s and the Indian Agricultura l Reserach Institute in breeding
varieties more suitable to Indian agro-climat ic conditions has been extremely
important in the success of the green revolution.

But external aid to these

institution s was technical assistance and not food aid.
Another major recipient of food aid in the fifties and sixties was Egypt.
Handoussa (1987) claims that during 1959-66 the availabilit y of food aid under
PL 480 enabled Egypt to save foreign exchange that would otherwise have been
spent on commercial food imports.

The saved foreign exchange was spent on

importing capital goods needed for industrial investment and growth.

More

than a third of merchandise imports in 1975 and a fourth in 1984 were
accounted for by food imports, mainly of wheat, vegetable oils and sugar.
Rice exports and output of wheat declined during 1975-85.

Cereal imports

increased from about 50% of domestic production in 1975 to 100% in 1984-85.
Cereal consumption grew at a phenomenal 15% per year on an average during the
same period.

This course of events was largely due to the heavily subsidized

food distributio n policy backed by imported food that was shown to be
politically difficult to change by the riots that ensued when a reduction in
the subsidy was attempted.
In the seventies and the eighties sub-saharan African countries have been
the major recipients of food aid.

To cite just a few cases from a study on

Managing Agricultura l Development in Africa by the World Bank, during the
period 1970-85 the volume of food aid grew at an average annual rate of 4.1%
in Cameroon, 43.1% in Kenya, 28.6% in Malawi, and 23.5% in Tanzania.

Ezekiel

(1986) states that between 1985 and 1990 food aid requirement s will grow by
about 25% in Kenya, 20% in Tanzania, 15% in Senegal and 14% in Cameroon.
There is also an increasing tendency to use food aid as a lever to promote
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structural adjustment and policy reform

(World Food Programme (1987)).

For

example, in the late seventies the US provided food aid to Bangladesh more or
less as a grant under Title III of PL480 in a multi-year program to sustain
Bangladesh 's attempt to reduce food subsidies and move towards an open market
food pricing system.

Eleven food aid donors, including the World Food

Progamme (WFP), have agreed to provide food aid to Mali in return for her
restructurin g the cereal marketing system, reducing the deficits of the
parastatal marketing boards, stabilizing cereal prices and improving farm
incomes.

A more broad-rangi ng reform of the agricultura l sector conditioned

on food aid is being attempted in Senegal and Madagascar.

In Ghana, where

disastorous policies had resulted in a substantial fall in real wages and
productivit y over several years, food aid, under WFP and the World Bank, is
being used to augment the real wages of workers engaged in key export sectors
as well as in the improvement of roads, post facilities and other
infrastruct ure.

In Grenada, local resources generated from sales of food aid

have been earmarked for specific use in support of a structural adjustment and
reform plan. On the other hand, in Morocco, food aid is to be used in a
compensator y program for people placed at nutritional risk during a structural
adjustment plan aimed at the elimination of food subsidies by 1990.

The

adjustment program was expected to reduce the real income of the very poor by
a fifth placing them at nutritional risk.

By expanding ongoing supplementa ry

feeding and school feeding projects using additional project food aid provided
by the US and World Food Programme, this risk is expected to be avoided.
Since the results from most of these program are not yet available for
evaluation, it is too soon to judge the effectivene ss of food aid in easing
structural adjustment costs.

6.

Policy Implication s and Conclusions
Food aid can play a useful role in furthering development and poverty

amelioratio n in situations in which the recipient country is generally
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following an appropriate development strategy and the aid is used either in
support of distributive policies that are effectively targeted at the poor or
in financing efficiently executed and effectively targeted investment
projects.

On the other hand, the use of any aid, in the form of food or

foreign exchange, in support of policy reform and adjustment has to be
carefully thought through so that it does not end up encouraging the very
thing it wants to eliminate, viz. inappropriate policies. Of course, the
effectiveness of the use of food aid can be enhanced substantially through
proper design, the choice of commodities, the flexibility with which
recipients could exchange with each other commodities supplied by aid and
their own output so as to make each recipient achieve greater benefits etc.
(Mellor and Ezekiel (1987), Hopkins (1987).
During the 50's and 60's the US and Canada were the major food aid donors
and South Asian states of India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka and to a lesser extent
other Asian states (Korea and the Philippines) got most of the aid.

With the

dramatic increase in food output in all of them and some of them accumulating·
large food stocks (over 25 million tons in India in June 1987) in the
eighties, it is tempting to conclude that purposively used food aid is a major
factor in this turn-about.

However, such a conclusion is too facile.

Certainly, food aid at concessional terms, particularly in years when domestic
output was way below trend levels because of unprecedented droughts, helped
India avert what could have been major disasters.

But, whatever push or

persuasion or leverage that aid donors may have applied, it is the
availability in the mid~sixties of dwarf varieites of wheat and rice with high
yield response to the use of heavy doses of chemical fertilizers that largely
explains the turn about.

Some of the domestic policy distortions, such as the

zonal restrictions in the movement of food, had been removed even earlier.

Of

course, the new technology brought in its wake new distortions: fertilizer
subsidies, irrigation subsidies, price support at levels that led to
accumulation of stocks etc, although the extent of their distortionary effects
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correctio ns for distortio ns in other sectors that in effect penalized
agricultu re. It may be time now to remove or reduce these distortio ns.

Still,

the fact remains, that the availabil ity of technolog y and the desire to
exploit it induced these, albeit distortion ary, producer incentive s.
With Sub-Sahar an Africa (SSA) replacing South Asia as the major recipient
of food aid (the share of SSA in cereal aid has gone up steadily from under 5%
in 1970-71 to nearly 50% in 1984-85), it may be thought that in SSA also, food
aid leverage can be used to turn the situation around.
warranted before any such conclusio n is drawn.

Extreme caution is

First of all, the domestic

policy distortio ns with respect to agricultu re in SSA appear to be far more
serious and pervasive than they ever were in South Asia.

In fact, South Asia

never experienc ed a decline in the trend of growth of food or agricultu ral
output, let alone a negative trend.

Although severe droughts in the Sahel

etc. are partly responsib le, still the declining trend in SSA output is a
·reflectio n largely of policy failures.

Most important of all, in South Asia a

research infrastru cture existed that could rapidly turn out rice and wheat
varieties that were bred to suit local condition s, once the dwarf genes became
available .

And in addition, an extension service for spreading the knowledge

about new varieties could be assembled , although some may claim that it is
still inadequat e.

None of these condition s exist in SSA to the same extent,

not to mention the differenc es in soil, climate and factor endowment s between
SSA and South Asia.

One should not be unduly optimisti c about the quick

success of food aid condition al on policy reform.

To put it more bluntly,

dommestic policy failure is the cause and the current food aid levels are
symptoms of the food crisis in SSA.

It remains to be seen whether policy

reform-co nditioned food aid will prove to be a cure.
Finally, for reasons discussed earlier, linking food aid with structura l
adjustmen t is problema tic.

In any case, the adjustmen t problems in SSA and in
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the heavily indebted, but considerabl y richer, Latin America are very
different. It is unlikely that in much better agricultura lly endowed Latin
America food aid will have much of a role to play in the structural adjustment
process.
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